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CERTAIN GNOSIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ORIGIN OF ART

- USSR -

by G. G. Agamalyan

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CERTAIN GNOSIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ORIGIN OF ART

[This is a translation of an article written by G. G. Agamalyan in Trudy Leningradskogo Inzhenerno-Ekonom. Insta, Kafedri Obshch Nauk (Works of the Leningrad Engineering Economics Institute, Chair of Social Sciences), No 24, 1958, pages 81-108.]

Marxist-Leninist sociology, which was the first to apply to the sphere of social relations the materialist principle of the primary nature of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness, demonstrated scientifically that all forms of man's psychological activity have arisen at various stages of the development of his material production. The question of the derivation of all forms of social consciousness and their dependence upon the development of social life constitutes a cornerstone of the Marxist-Leninist methodology, and deals a crushing blow to all Idealistic attempts by a certain portion of contemporary bourgeois scientists to prove the eternal and inviolable nature of all forms of human psychological activity. On the basis of purely political, class considerations, these bourgeois scientists try in every way to defend the idea of an unchanging human nature based on private property, government, and religion. All these endeavors boil down to an attempt at proving the primordial nature of all forms of man's psychological activity.

Under present-day conditions this question takes on a special kind of urgency, since a considerable portion of the bourgeois scientists (Henri Breyle [Breyl'], G. Obermayer, G. Kuhn, G. Osborne, et al.), several of whom wear the cassock and frock, are engaged in a detail study of everything relating to the earliest times, not only in man's social history but in his biological history, in order to demonstrate by pseudo-scientific methods the inviolability of the foundations of bourgeois society. Despite the facts, striving their utmost to carry out the social orders of the imperialist bourgeoisie, they are bending every effort to prove that the family, religion, art, and government existed as early as the Lower Paleolithic, when society had not yet been formed and human beings followed a gregarious way of life.

Marxist-Leninist esthetics recognizes the objective existence of beauty in natural surroundings. But the capacity of human beings esthetically to evaluate any phenomena in the environment depends directly upon the degree of their works -- upon the degree of the humanization of nature.

In the process of work, man changes not only his surroundings but himself. But since art is the highest form of man's appropriation of nature, what takes place in art is an assertion of human nature, "Not only through thought but through all feelings." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol. III, 1st edition, page 627.)

In the early stages of social development, man looked upon the works of his hands merely from a utilitarian viewpoint. The esthetic evaluation of nature itself scarcely existed; since nature, as the embodiment of fearful and plainly inimical forces, was man's opponent. This situation continued until man had learned to subjugate those forces to one degree or another -- until through his own labor, man had created a taste for nature and, consequently, a natural feeling in man.

Thus beauty in the environment exists objectively and independently of man; but it exists only for man, since the evaluation of beauty is a specifically human quality formed in the process of his socio-historical experience. Consequently, the concrete-historical approach is fully applicable to esthetic evaluations. Although in general and as a whole, human concepts of beauty bear the impress of a specific period, this by no means rules out the presence therein of unvarying human factors. Rhythm, symmetry, and the harmonious combination of natural objects have always existed; but man began to notice and utilize them only at a certain stage in his material and spiritual development.

Man's awareness of the beauties of nature is not a simply and passive act of perception: it assumes first of all a certain mental behavior, a certain degree of activity. Only the consideration of art as active human behavior helps to explain the great influence it exercises on the social life of man.

The socio-economic factors in the formation of esthetic tastes and the artistic activity of social man have been emphasized in our esthetic literature on the problem of the origin of art. (Worthy of note in this connection is the doctoral dissertation of I. B. Astakhov, with several of whose basic views the author of the present article finds himself in agreement. Cf. I. B. Astakhov, "The Origin and Development of Art in the Light of Marxist-Leninist Esthetics." Dissertation for the Academic Degree of Doctor of Philological Sciences. M, 1953.) But for purposes of clarifying the nature of art and the process of its formation, it does not suffice to establish merely the socio-economic factors -- although from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist methodology these factors are decisive and determining. For this purpose it is also necessary to consider several problems of epistemology; since art viewed as thought in images, as a unique form of penetrating into the essence of phenomena in the environment, is associated with a specific level of development of abstract-logical thought. For the best understanding of certain epistemological problems associated with the origin of art, it is essential from the outset to analyze

the nature of primitive thought, since it is the basis of the formation and further development of all forms of social consciousness.

The materials which ethnography now has available relative to primitive thought refer only to peoples living under a tribal system, since they have best preserved the primitive traits. By virtue of this fact, the bourgeois scientist V. Levy-Bruhl has tried to show that among primitives and economically backward peoples, thought was so primitive and undeveloped that it possessed an impractical and pre-practical character. (Cf. L. [sic] Levy-Bruhl, "Primitive Thought." Ateist [The Atheist], 1930.)

However, it is obvious that no pre-practical thought ever existed, since the laws of the development of thought are uniform for all peoples. It is quite clear that in the absence of thought which was fundamentally practical, there would have been no possibility of purposeful human activity in combatting the forces of nature, nor of the process of the humanization of our distant anthropoid ancestors and their gradual detachment from nature. As he discovered the properties of the objects in his environment, man established causal relationships among them, in the absence of which his existence as a social being was not conceived.

What necessitated Levy-Bruhl's pronouncements on pre-practical thought? It goes without saying that he had need of them to provide a rationale and justification for the preservation of the colonial system vis-a-vis the economically backward peoples whose development was hindering, and still hinders, the domination of the imperialists.

In the Soviet Union, those peoples who prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution had lived under tribal conditions, rapidly overcame their economic and cultural lag in the course of building socialism, and developed outstanding cadres of their own intelligentsia. These peoples of the close-knit, equalitarian Soviet family, rapidly passing through several intermediate stages of historical development, have created their own national culture, and together with all others, are building a communist society. Does this not testify to the tendentiousness and prejudices of Levy-Bruhl, who has little concern for a genuinely scientific approach to explaining the phenomena of society?

It is true that thought, in the early stages of development, since it was directly associated with material activity, was characterized by vividness. The abstracting function of human thought was at that time so negligible that it severely limited the possibilities for its orientation toward the environment. F. Engels showed convincingly that owing to their feeble capacity for abstraction, primitive human beings could count only those objects which were directly in their field of vision. Moreover, their number was always associated with that which was being counted. F. Engels wrote: "In order to count one must not only have available the objects to be counted; one must also have the ability, when

considering these objects, to disregard all of their other properties except their number. And this ability is the result of a long historical development founded on experience." (F. Engels, "Anti-Duhring." Gospolitizdat, [State Publishing House of Political Literature], M, 1950, page 37.) It is not surprising that at the dawn of the tribal society, human thought was of a predominantly empirical character, and the level of generalization was extraordinarily low.

Although all of our conclusions are based on data about economically underdeveloped peoples, they do throw some light on the nature of primitive thought. It seems that the Bakairi Indians of Brazil, a settled tribe who engage in agriculture involving the use of the hoe, (i.e., whose level of development is higher than that of the Vedda tribe in Ceylon), have manifested an astounding incapacity to count up to five. Professor R. I. Gruber writes: "In order to count anything, even if it is no more than four or five grains, the Baikiri lay it out in bunches (one or two grains to a bunch) and then begin to add them up mechanically, crooking their fingers and repeating each time "This," "This again," "This again," never neglecting to touch each object (this is de rigueur). And we can observe the same thing in music. The primitive stubbornly repeats the same note as though he were afraid to leave it, to "stumble." Scarcely has he left the basic note and changed to the following one, when he hurries to go back to the basic position. And this it goes, "one step forward, one step back." (R. I. Gruber, "The History of Musical Culture." Vol. I, Muzgiz [State Music Publishing House], M, 1941, page 35.) R. I. Gruber also comments that for them the relationship among different keys is extremely primitive, as a result of the limited consciousness of the savage who has only recently tried to conceive of his own position and to detach himself from his environment, raising himself to the first stages of generalization.

According to the well-known Polar explorer, F. Nansen, among the Eskimos the number five signified one right hand, the number six one finger on the left hand, the sumber seven a second finger, etc. The number 20 signified one person. (Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy], 1954, No. 5, page 69.) Our great compatriot, N. N. Mikulkho-Maklay, who spent a long time among the Papuans, gave the following description of the method of counting commonly used by them. "Their favorite method of counting consists in the following. The Papuan crooks the fingers of one hand, one after another, and utters a specific sound; for example, "Be-be-be." When he has reached the number five, he says "Ibonbe" (hand). Then he crooks the fingers of his other hand, and again repeats "Be-be..." until he reaches "Sambe-be" and "Samba-ali" (one foot, two feet). (N. N. Maklukho-Maklay, "Collected Works." Part III, M-L, 1951, page 177.)

Thus in all of the foregoing examples we have a picture

wherein counting takes place not apart from the objects being counted but in direct association with them, and the reflection of the quantitative aspect of the objects merges, as it were, with the objects themselves. Fingers are the means by which the number of other objects are determined. It is only with the further development of their capacity to abstract, that human beings have learned to do without counters in counting objects.

Primitive thought also manifested itself in the fact that the reflection of the quality of the objects was considered as an object. For example, the most backward tribe of the Aruntas the words "sky," "clear," and "light blue" all had the same meaning. This fact indicates once again that human beings were not thinking of the nature of things considered separately from their concrete varieties. Consequently, the capacity for abstraction was very low among primitive man. Scientific abstractions could develop -- and, on their basis, the corresponding fields of human knowledge could come into being -- only as a result of a long development of thought.

In this connection it is not inappropriate to mention the experiments with anthropoid apes conducted by the well-known psychologist V. Keller, who tried to show that the sudden development of reational forms of behavior in anthropoid apes was quite possible. The experiments carried out by I. P. Pavlov in this area disclosed a very curious phenomenon. It developed that in the apes servingas subjects, the formation of conditioned reflexes was accompanied by a potent excitation in the motor zone of the cerebral cortex, only slightly restrained by the inhibiting factor, which is noticeably developed in man and which is formed as the result of long evoiution. Therefore, despite experiments conducted over a period of many years, Keller was unable to prove the correctness of his hypothesis: none of his apes could be taught rational and intelligent acts; none of them could entertain concepts as man does, since their nervous activity does not extend beyond the limits of the primary signal system.

Consequently, those intelligent forms of behavior proper to man are the fruit of a long process of the humanization of our brutish ancestors.

As we know, for animals, too, the phenomena of the environment are perceived as certain images of the objective world. The biophysical basis of the activity of the sensory organs of animals is the same as in man. Thus we cannot deduce the difference between man and the animals merely from the existence of a secondary signal system in the former; one must emphasize difference in the qualitative diversity of functions in the primary signal system as well, regardless of the anatomical and physiological similarities.

It is certainly plain that for the development, say, of musically similar sounds one most possess not only the faculty of hearing, but a kind of hearing which, in the expression of B. A. Asaf'yev, is directed by the intellect. But this kind of hearing

is formed in the process of the historical development of human society. The sounds uttered by animals are esthetically indeterminate. With man it is quite different. The combining of sounds to form music takes place only at that stage in the intellectual development of man when his ratiocinative activity has become sufficiently complex, since music includes both a sound component and a thought component. Thus, I. P. Pavlov correctly assumed that the most important criterion distinguishing man from animals was the elaboration of abstract concepts.

The role of abstract concepts in the creative, artistic activity of man is infinitely great. Thus not only the centers of vision but also the cerebral apparatus as a whole participates in the artistic activity associated, for example, with the graphic arts.

The classical authors of Marxism-Leninism convincingly showed that a real understanding of the nature of the origin of art should be sought in the development of thought and the perfection of the sense organs. It is superfluous to mention that work and articulate speech were the chief stimuli in transforming the brain of the apes into a human brain. F. Engels wrote: "In parallel with the development of the brain proceeded the development of its most immediate tools -- the sense organs. Just as the gradual development of speech was necessarily accompanied by the perfection of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain in general was accompanied by the perfection of all of the senses taken together. The eagle sees much farther than man; but the human eye notices much more in what it sees than does the eye of the eagle." "The development of the brain and of the sensations subordinated thereto, increasingly illuminated by consciousness and the capacity for abstractions and drawing conclusions, exercised a reciprocal influence on work and language, proving both with increasing numbers of new points for further development." (F. Engels, "The Dialectics of Nature." Gospolitizdat, M. 1950, pages 135-136.) Consequently, art, as one of the forms of spiritual production, could arise only at a specific stage in the development of the human consciousness and its feelings.

The development of the human hand was also of tremendous importance. According to F. Engels's definition, the hand is not only an organ of work but a product of work. Because of the fact that the skills acquired by the hand for increasingly complex operations were transmitted from generation to generation, it reached that high stage of development at which it was able, "as though endowed with magic power, to create the paintings of Rafael, the statues of Thorwaldsen, and the music of Paganini." (F. Engels, "The Dialectics of Nature," page 133.)

Although the human hand is an organ possessing the most varied functions with which those of a similar paw cannot compare to any extent, it was not merely this which favored the detachment of man

from the animal world and his amazing progress. Marx and Engels called attention to that extremely important fact, the "extension" of the human sense organs associated with the use of various implements.

In this connection it is difficult to overestimate the role of work in the process of the artistic appropriation of the world by man, since this is the decisive factor in the formation of human nature itself. In the absence of implements, in the absence of their use and improvement, the humanization of human feelings would not have occurred. It was precisely their employment which engendered new objects, while the latter engendered corresponding needs, in the final analysis changing human nature itself. Indeed, as Marx pointed out, by virtue of its emergence, art helped to engender a public with a taste for that art, which stimulated the further development of esthetic feeling. Thanks to the use of implements, man changed his own world of feeling so much that it entitled him to speak of a new quality possessed by the primary signal system of man in contradistinction to the primary signal system of animals.

Thus the human sense organs and the human consciousness were from the very outset a social product. But the process of the humanization of feelings and their differentiation and specialization depends in the final analysis upon an analogous kind of progress taking place in work itself. The eye of modern man can distinguish colors and all possible nuances of colors to an extent exceeding the capacity not only of animals but also of human beings in the earliest stages of social development. They did not have any such stimulus, despite the fact that from a physiological viewpoint their eyes were prepared for the perception of all existing colors. For example, the vocabulary of the ancient Greeks of Homeric times lacked words for designating certain colors.

We have already noted that man himself, with his enriched powers of perception, emerged as the result of a long historical development. Human feelings constitute a condition precedent to the development and discovery of esthetic emotions. As we know, the primitive consciousness at the tribal stage was associated with religion; i.e., with all possible forms of the deification of surrounding objects of the material world; and the first idealogues were of course priests.

The rise of religion was strictly in accordance with the laws of historical development. Its epistemological roots were associated with the fantastic reflection, in the minds of human beings, of those external forces which dominated them and their daily lives. This reflection was distorted and illusory -- a result of man's feeling of powerlessness before the dominating forces of nature. It was not without reason that those ancient thinkers belonging to the materialist camp explained belief in the gods as the result

of man's fear and helplessness.

Thus the fantastic factors played a tremendous important role in primitive thought. Consequently, the distorted reflection of natural phenomena was due not only to primitive man's helplessness in the fact of the dominant natural forces, but also to the epistemological fact of thought's detachment from reality -- from the very nature of abstraction.

V. I. Lenin dealt with this fact in his "Philosophical Notebooks." As we know, the process of the reflection of reality in the human brain is of a very complex and involved character, fraught with possible illusions. Idealism and religion are by no means haphazard phenomena: their origins have specific epistemological roots. After giving an astoundingly profound explanation of the epistemological roots of Idealism, V. I. Lenin wrote: "The duality of human cognition and the possibility of Idealism (equal religion) are given already in the first elementary abstraction... The approach of the mind (of man) to an individual thing, and the act of taking a mold (equals concept) therefrom, is not a simple, direct act as though with a motionless mirror; it is complex, bifurcated, and tortuous, including in itself the possibility of a flight of fantasy away from reality. Also, there is the possibility of the transformation (and a transformation of which the human being is not aware) of an abstract concept or idea into a fantasy (in the final analysis, this equals God). (V. I. Lenin, "Philosophical Notebooks," Gospolitizdat, M, 1947, page 308.)

In many cases a real knowledge of external reality was displaced by various unlikely fabrications and notions. But this by no means meant that primitive man was definitely deprived of the possibility of a more or less correct orientation toward his environment. Otherwise, his definite, purposeful activity aimed at increasingly removing himself from the conditions of animals, and the gradual taming of the natural and blind forces of nature, would have been impossible.

As we know, Marx and Engels defined the gregarious state as the earliest stage in the development of consciousness. At that stage, man was distinguished from the animals by the formation of a secondary signal system. This constituted an awareness of nature, which, it is true, was opposed to man as an all-powerful and inaccessible force. During the period of the primitive tribal system the savage, in V. I. Lenin's words, had not detached himself from nature, which was represented in his confused imagination as continuous supernatural force; whereas the ancient Hellene distinguished himself from nature, and raised himself above it.

Thus when we speak of "primitive Idealism" we are referring not to some system of views but to the fact that man, making a distinction between himself and the natural world, in the process of thinking about natural processes, deified them as a result of his

weakness and also as a result of the fact that, in the words of V. I. Lenin, the duality of human cognition and the possibility of Idealism (which equals religion) were already given in the first elementary abstraction -- "house" in general, and individual "houses." (Cf. V. I. Lenin, "Philosophical Notebooks," page 303.) Thus the attempts of primitive man to subordinate himself to these all-powerful forces inevitably led in the final analysis to the development of various notions of allegedly existing magic powers.

Not being able directly to act on all of the natural processes taking place around him, primitive man gradually developed, in his thinking, notions of the existence of certain secret forces with which it was necessary to make a definite contact with a view to winning their favor. Only in this way could he conceive the possibility of the practical achievement of his ends.

Given only primitive weapons, hunting wild animals was accompanied by incredible difficulties. Hence the representation of the animal, and magic directed against him, became a very important part of hunting itself. This led to the development, subsequently, of totem forms of religious ideas. The various representations of animals found on the walls of caves bear the traces of wounds caused by weapons used in hunting. Consequently, this indicates rites which involved the magical killing of images of various animals which were considered as good omen and an indispensable prelude to good hunting.

Modern economically backward peoples -- in particular the Australian and African pygmies -- before going hunting, draw on the sand an image of a certain animal, and then perform the ritual of its imaginary killing. After the hunt, the image is effaced. The utilitarian character of such art is evident, whether it be graphic or choreographic, since in both cases the imaginary killing of the animals must obligatorily precede the hunt. If not, the hunt is doomed to failure, will all of the consequent serious results for primitive man.

Therefore, with certain reservations one may accept R. I. Gruber's following statement to the effect that "the beginnings of the ideological activity of primitive man as a whole are nearer to the art than to any other form of ideology, precisely by virtue of the figurative representation of the ideology at that stage of development." (R. I. Gruber, "The History of Musical Culture," Vol. I, page 149.)

But one can scarcely agree with his unsubstantiated affirmation that "here we are dealing with artistic activity, since all criteria of art are present." (Ibid. page 148). In accordance with a purely formal criterion -- i.e., on the basis of the fact that figurative representations of reality occur in a primitive society -- R. I. Gruber affirms the existence of all of the basic criteria of art at the dawn of human society. In referring art to

the stage of the lowest level of the intellectual development of man, Gruber assumes that it therefore precedes the rise of primitive forms of religion.

The sources of these conclusions must be sought in the general methodological conception of N. Ya. Marr. R. Gruber gives due credit to N. Ya. Marr on the basis that the history of thought passes through two stages of development: 1) concrete-figurative and 2) formal-logical. Pre-verbal gesture language corresponds to concrete-figurative thought, while spoken language corresponds to formal-logical thought. On the basis of this, R. I. Gruber arrives at the following conclusion: since, originally, thought bears a concrete-figurative character, the most favorable conditions for the flowering of art are created. Thus it follows that figurative-artistic thought excludes abstraction and generalization, and is based as a whole upon mechanical, naturalistic copying. An impassable abyss opens up between art as thought in images and science as thought in concepts. However, art, like science, can and does give man, in varying degrees, the objective and absolute truth, although the boundaries of this reflection are arbitrary and relative. It is generally known that the artist is a thinker to the same extent as the scientist. In the figurative-sensory form, selecting the most essential aspects of reality, the artist discloses the laws underlying the processes taking place in reality to the same extent as does the scientist in the form of abstract concepts. A. M. Gorky emphasized that art, like science, is subordinated to the laws of abstraction, the selection of characteristic traits, and the generalization of those traits.

Moreover, there is a very serious methodological flaw in this conception. Its supporters are unwilling to understand the fact that figurative thought, to no less a degree than scientific thought, requires abstraction -- especially in such areas of art as music, choreography, and creative literature.

I. K. Ayvazovskiy, the outstanding painter, strikingly showed in his own work the very important role of abstract thought in the process of creating works of art. He wrote: "The painter who merely copies nature becomes its slave, bound hand and foot. The movements of the actual elements cannot be captured by the brush: to copy from nature a flash of lightning, a gust of wind, or the splash of a wave is inconceivable. Therefore, the painter must remember them in order to introduce them into his pictures. In my case the subject of a picture is composed in my memory, as the subject of a poem is for a poet... A sine qua non for my studio is plain walls, with no pictures and no sketches. Physical distance from the scene represented in my picture only compels me to see all of its details more clearly and vividly in my imagination. In the Crimea, I paint views of the Baltic Coast; in a summer landscape, I paint winter landscapes; on cloudy days, I paint clear days -- a cloudless sky with a rising sun. I represent sorrow and joy much more

forcefully when they pass into the realm of the imagined. My imagination is stronger than my receptivity to actual ideas: they are recorded in my memory in some kind of invisible ink, which is made very clearly legible by the action of time or the warm rays of inspiration." ("Old Days in Russia." Vol. 22, 1878, page 425.)

The artist, regardless of the particular art he represents, is a thinker to the same extent as any scientist or philosopher.

There can be no doubt of the fact that art, like other forms of human behavior, is stimulated by urgent practical needs. It is incontestable, for example, that painting developed out of the practical necessity for designating objects. According to Miklukho-Maklay, primitive paintings should be considered as the embryo of figurative writing. The artistic-figurative designation of various phenomena associated with the activity of primitive man replaces the naturalistic representation. The graphic representation of a fish or some wild animal on the ground or on a cliff must signify that certain species of fauna have their habitat there. It was precisely in this way that primitive hunters were able to communicate information as to the hunting grounds for game and places for catching fish. Thus artistic thought developed with the objective course of social development.

If we consider such an art as music, we can see that it by no means signifies onomatopoeia. Rather, being an artistic reproduction of human speech in all of its manifestations, it is replete with deep content and thought. Moreover, it possesses very great possibilities of representation. Also, music in a certain sense even surpasses the potentialities of such arts as painting and sculpture.

A very great representative of Russian Realism, I. Ye. Repin, paying tribute to the composer, Rimsky-Korsakov, for his incomparable musical rendering of aspects of the sea, said: "Do you think it is possible for the colors of painting to compete with the tone colors of music (the sea in 'Scheherezade,' "Sadko," and "Saltana")? I wouldn't even try." (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Through the Past to the Future." In "Sovetskaya Muzyka" [Soviet Music] 1943, No. 1.) In the opinion of I. Ye. Repin, the palette of tone colors is considerably richer than the painter's palette.

The perception of reality through the devices of art is not accomplished by the intellect alone. It also opens up a limitless expanse for the purely emotional sphere. In his speech at a meeting of musicians at the CC ACP(b), A. A. Zhdanov said that "the more strings of the human soul it makes vibrate, the greater a musical composition is." (In the collection, "Meeting of Soviet Musicians at the CC ACP(b)." Gospolitizdat, M, 1948, page 144.) That is, music is one of the most expressive manifestations of the emotional state of the human psyche.

A. P. Serov, a passionate partisan of Realism, receives with

hostility any manifestation of esthetic agnosticism, since agnosticism has meant on the practical plane that the content of music cannot be expressed in the form of concepts. He has defended in every way the idea of a deep significance in music. For example, folk songs, in his expression, in words and in music, taken together, are full of feelings and thought. In considering problems of instrumental music, he stated that it is not a simple transposition of sounds or a kind of crystallization of melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic values arranged in beautiful forms. Music is the language of the soul -- the sphere of feelings and moods. (Cf. A. N. Serov, "Selected Articles." Vol. I, Muzgiz, M-L, 1950, pages 92-92.) As for cantilena, voice control, rhythm, and tone coloring -- these are only means expressing more or less definite spiritual moods. But a subjective form of reproduction by no means contradicts the objective content of music, which exists independently of our consciousness. As is known, the esthetic aspect of art is directly related to its cognitive and didactic aspect. However, the important thing -- the thing which makes art a specific form of human behavior -- is the esthetic aspect.

The partisans of Formalism in music cannot understand this simple and obvious truth. They advocate meaningless and atonal music in no way related to the stirring of deep thoughts and feelings in the hearts of men.

The Party and the Central Committee have always taken an intrasigent attitude toward all manifestations of Formalism in music, and have resolutely opposed all attempts to consign vocal music and the vocal aspect of instrumental music to oblivion; against unnecessary sound effects and the violation of elementary laws of harmony, which are the consequence of ignoring the thought content in music.

The most zealous partisan of Formalism in music was Ed. Ganslik, a follower of Kant and a well-known idealogue of Formalist esthetics. He opposed the generally accepted point of view that music has its own content. While Ganslik recognized melody, he reduced it to a meaningless arrangement of sounds -- to the movement of sound forms. He felt that music finds no models or material for its own creations in external reality. Moreover, allowing only onomatopoeia, he considered that music was incapable of expressing not only thought but even feelings. He wrote: "Music consists of a combination of tones and forms, and they have no other content than themselves." (Ed. Ganslik, "On Beauty in Music." M, 1885, page 61.) Consequently, music is not a means of reflecting reality, but only a totality of sounds deprived of its most important attribute -- content. How reminiscent this is of Hegel's dictum that music is concerned with the tonal expression of meaningless emotions, and therefore has little need -- or no need at all -- of spiritual material. Since music does not function as a unique artistic form for the reflection of reality, the ideological

aspect of music, in Ganslik's view, refers to the realm of sounds and not to the realm of intelligence. By way of argument in defense of his viewpoint he cites ornamentation.

As an advocate of Formalism, Ganslik was by no means alone. K. Egyes, his zealous follower in Russia, frankly affirmed that "musical compositions, being merely combinations of sounds, can in no case represent any picture of nature, or any external phenomena at all." (K. Egyes, "Essays in the Philosophy of Music." M. 1958, page 69.) Like Ganslik, he acknowledged only onomatopoeia, considering it as a kind of amusement. Such a pillar of Idealism as Schopenhauer went so far as to say that music could have a certain degree of existence even if the world did not exist at all. And Stravinsky has stated that music is essentially incapable of expressing any feeling, psychological state, or phenomenon of nature.

The idealogues of Russian Formalism, who in 1924 founded the Association of Contemporary Music in Moscow, were the mouth pieces of Formalism and Cosmopolitanism in Soviet music, which had been imported from abroad. The quintessence of their philosophy was the thesis that music does not express ideas, since it is merely the organization of sound. Hence the insistent advocacy of a special, unusual musical expression which does not resemble the music of yesterday. Thus they considered onomatopoeia not as a means, but as an end in itself. Considering that classical music does not contain any esthetic value, they opposed it in every way with the notorious "new" music. The activity of this organization was a hindrance to the development of our music, and therefore was sharply disapproved by Soviet society.

In his speech at the meeting of Soviet musicians, A. A. Zhdanov pointed out that innovation is not always the equivalent of progress. The new must be better than the old; otherwise, there is no point in introducing the new. Thus the advocacy of Esthetic Formalism, which is preached by all of the pillars of Formalism, objectively leads to the rejection of esthetics as a science, since from their viewpoint the content of music cannot be expressed in the form of concepts.

In art, as we know, the meaningful aspect is disclosed through the affective aspect. Therefore, the socio-historical experience of human beings must necessarily find its reflection in art. However, art reflects not only the material world of our environment, but since it has social significance, the social life of human beings as well. As for the material world, it is reflected to the extent that it is related to the social life. This is why one of the most important causes of the fall of some of our composers was the fact that they were very little concerned with reflecting reality. And even where this reflection occurred, it was of a perverted, distorted, and even pathological nature. These meaningless conglomerations of sounds proved to be foreign to the tastes of the Soviet public,

and provoked nothing but dissatisfaction.

The Formalistic tendency in music is not something new. P. I. Tchaikovsky said that the Formalistic tricks in music were a "frightful trend" and "contemporary cacophony." Subsequently these tendencies did not weaken but, on the contrary, grew stronger. And this was quite natural. The modern bourgeoisie, singing the praises of zoological Naturalism and music empty of ideological content, have raised atonality and dissonance to the level of a virtue. They give maximum support to that kind of art which corresponds least of all to the task of satisfying normal human emotions.

As we know, any artistic figure is to a certain extent the fruit of fantasy and invention. What would happen to the artistic, scientific, and practical activity of human beings if they were guided only by the data of memory and sensory preceptions? V. I. Lenin taught that emotion and fantasy are necessary not only to artists but to scientists as well. The elements of foresight, boldness, assumption, hypothesis, and logical conclusions are vitally necessary to genuinely creative science. This applies to an even greater degree to art as the artistic form of understanding the psychic world of man.

If, from the viewpoint of Marx, any sphere of man's practical activity requires of him an obligatory creative vigor of the intelligence, with respect to art this vigor must be multiplied in intensity, since the task of art is not the reflection of reality in general, but the reflection of the relationship of social man to reality. Therefore, art requires greater and more profound thoughts.

The tremendous importance of verbal language in the rapid progress of human cognition and hearing is quite obvious; and in the absence of such verbal communication, the development of art in general and music in particular would have been impossible. However, among certain Soviet musicians under the influence of the views of Marra, there were tendencies to ignore the role of speech, which meant an underestimation of the active creative beginnings in man. For example, A. K. Butskoy, in his work, "The Structure of Musical Language," reduces everything to re-arranging of the sounds of nature. He wrote: "Human society, together with re-arranging the sounds of nature into musical sounds with their new organization and new possibilities for expression, utilized that primitive thought with which the sounds of nature were endowed as a means of cognition, in order to create from it the content of the expressive devices of music." (A. K. Butskoy, "The Structure of Musical Language." Muzgiz, L, 1948, page 125.) But the question then arises: Why, at the very dawn of the existence of the human species, did these sounds not provoke corresponding reactions on its part: Consequently, it is by no means a question of sounds as such. The peculiar nature of music consists in the fact that it assumes the production of

figurative sounds within strictly defined limits. Music constitutes a new art by comparison with existing natural sounds, and even as compared to speech. The conclusions that Butskoy draws in his work are based on an identification between the artistic figure, which is a product of the abstracting activity of human thought, and the sensory figure.

Even in his time, N. G. Chernyshevskiy vigorously opposed the term "imitation," declaring that pseudo-classical theory had interpreted art as a kind of imitation of reality with a view to deceiving man. The aim of art is not imitation (since to say this is to denigrate the role of the creative factor, which is decisive in art) but the reproduction of the most important aspects of reality. Indeed, the sphere of art is always the relationship of social man, with his feelings and thoughts enriched by the world, to nature -- but not nature per se. Therefore, any genuinely artistic work of art is not the fruit of imitation but of the imagination, nourished by vital experience and external reality.

The basis of melody, which embodies the unity of content and form in music, is not derived from nature per se but from the active relationship between man and nature as a product of the long development of human thought. The astounding achievements in the realm of melody would have been impossible without a tremendous amount of work in accumulating experience in meaningful intonation.

B. V. Asaf'yev has shown in a remarkable manner how this process took place in general and as a whole. In his words, the composer, receiving and absorbing "vocal folk music," interprets it in his own work. "Vocal folk music" embodies the artistic experience of the people. That is why the traditional development of musical art is based on a constantly shifting re-intonation -- in Asaf'yev's expression from era to era, form style to style -- of especially popular intonations. Therefore, outstanding composers who have deeply absorbed the feeling of the folk quality of musical language, have achieved monumental generalizations of folk music practice in the highest forms of music. In Russia this historic mission was performed by Glinka, in Czechoslovakia by Smetana, in Poland by Chopin, and in Norway by Grieg. (Cf. B. V. Asaf'yev, "The Composer: His Name is the People." "Sovetskaya Muzyka," 1949, No 2.)

From the foregoing it follows that the generalizing activity of human thought lies at the basis of music and other forms of art.

It is generally known that music originated in vocal form. But this has by no means hindered the affirmation that vocal music arose before phonetic speech. This statement cannot of course stand up under any criticism, since it ignores not only the development of the material living conditions of society but also the development of thought.

It is significant that even in these years when the theory of Marr was predominant in Soviet linguistics, Academician Asaf'yev

was expressing the uniquely correct viewpoint that neither poetry nor music could have attained such heights in cultural history if "primitive man had not possessed a clear and precise 'intonation' speech; or, more accurately, a language of intonations. That multiple significance of content which is proper to metaphors -- to concepts of languages in the original (but not only the original) stage of their development, was it not also differentiated for human hearing by the finest nuances of intonation -- i.e., in the given case, by the tonal significance of expression?" (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Musical Form as a Process." Book II, Muzgiz, M-L, 1947, page 34.)

At the basis of the art of music lies language. But not all combinations of sounds constitute music. Only specific sounds endowed with a special pitch sequence and properties which make it possible to transform them into musical figures, can answer to this description. Moreover, the result of this combination of sounds must necessarily be melody -- the soul of music -- which also forms the source of esthetic pleasure. Consequently, in the absence of the esthetic element there is no music.

Music is a specific product of creative activity. Melody, which expresses thought and feeling, is also a figure which reflects reality. However, it would be fallacious to affirm that the origin of music is based on sounds existing in finished form in nature. Darwin, however, associating the origin of music (he means vocal music, of course) with the animal kingdom, identified the biological requirement with the esthetic.

From Darwin's viewpoint, the attraction of the sexes formed the basis for the development of so-called music birds. But birds do not sing merely during that period when they want to "give pleasure." The singing -- or, more accurately, the production of harmonious sounds -- of birds is of a biological character, and they have no regard whatsoever for the esthetic function of the sounds. And this is not to mention those animals close to man in terms of their degree of biological development who do not sing but simply howl. Darwin's error consisted in the fact that he equated music with any free reproduction of sounds.

Music means the reproduction of sounds effected in a definite order. As we know, the human consciousness becomes accustomed to the reproduction of sounds which can be anticipated and repeated, without being kept at the same pitch level. However, experiments with parrots have shown that in all cases they have kept the same tonality, whereas for even the most backward tribes there has been no difficulty in transposing a certain primitive motif, making it higher or lower, in accordance with the texture of the voice.

Another erroneous viewpoint is that which holds that music arose from emotional, excited speech. It must not be forgotten

that speech, while it possesses various variations in pitch, does not maintain those definite intervals so indispensable to music. Consequently, the origin of music is organically related to the level of development of human thought itself -- to its capacity for abstraction and generalization. In the absence of this factor the reproduction of the phenomena of nature in concrete sensory figures is inconceivable.

Thus music is a social phenomena which arose only at a specific stage of man's social development. The well-known German musicologist K. Shtumpf, whereas he did not share Darwin's biological conception, agreed with Spencer in affirming that in its original form music derived from speech signals and cries. (Cf. K. Shtumpf, "The Origin of Music." "Triton," L, 1927 (1926.) It follows from this that conventional speech becomes singing in cases where a man finds himself in a state of affection or of strong excitation, and that this especially excited state is the cause of the origin of singing. This kind of explanation belongs in the realm of physiology and not of sociology. As we know, the production of sound in animals is a purely psych-physical reaction to the effect of the environment, devoid of thought content, whereas the most primitive music assumes significant and premeditated intonation.

Academician Asaf'yev, author of a theory of musical intonation, pointed out with complete justification that "music could not of course have arisen from emotionally excited human speech, since human speech itself and the musical system of intervals governing the art of musical sounds are possible only if there is the capacity for producing intonations; i.e., sound production controlled by breathing and the rational activity of the human intellect. (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Musical Form as a Process." Book II, page 140.) Moreover, in his opinion, this intonation, in merging with the intonation of speech, is enriched with new means of expression.

There is a great deal in common between music and speech. Both reflect reality by means of sounds. B. Asaf'yev called music living speech, clearly reflecting reality, as does verbal speech. With the development of human society language improved, and the role of intonation grew along with it. But intonation has not only served as a means of expressing the emotional state of man: to a certain extent it has also served as a means of expressing his thoughts. It was not without relevance that Asaf'yev pointed out that in human speech, "thought consists not only in words, but in the way they are brought to the consciousness of the listener and interlocutor in each emotional tone, dynamics, shading, rapidity, etc." (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Essays on Soviet Musical Creation." Vol. I, Muzgiz, M-L, 1947, page 20.) Consequently, music is an art of intonation, since in the absence of intonation it is only a combination of sounds. In order to be a social phenomenon, music must represent the unity of material sound and aural reception.

The well-known Russian composer and music critic, A. N. Serov, pointed out that the purpose of the art of music consists in penetrating into the soul of man by means of expressive sound. But expressive sound has not only an emotional aspect but an intellectual aspect as well. It also acts on the mind. The more deeply and realistically it reflects reality, the fuller and more colorful its action. But this is within the competence only of genuinely Realistic music which utilizes all of the tonal palette at its command to express the richest world not only of an imagined but of a really existing man. Formalism, which maintains that music possesses a special nature peculiar to itself and has nothing in common with external reality, cannot come under this head.

Despite Engel's clear statement that the development of the cerebral apparatus took place under the influence of discursive speech, R. Gruber and several other investigators of the problem of the origin of music were subject to the influence of Marr's theory. They considered that phonetic speech arose at a high stage of social development; and therefore that singing, being associated with gesture language, preceded phonetic speech. (Cf. R. I. Gruber, "The History of Musical Culture." Vol. I.) However, this theory is profoundly erroneous. In the process of their work, human beings developed as a matter of natural necessity a requirement for expressive means of communication and a desire to say something to one another. It was precisely this fact which stimulated the development and perfection of the cerebral apparatus. Consequently, phonetic speech prepared the way for singing, and preceded it. It required many millenia before the necessary physiological and psychic prerequisites were created for the development of the possibility of song. Therefore, the statement that singing preceded articulate speech has nothing in common with Marxism. Those who advocate this conception fall into the position of biologism, and go so far as to recognize in anthropoid apes, intentionally depriving it of specifically human social significance. It is true that in combatting theories of the primacy a feeling for beauty, those who held what music originated before phonetic speech considered music a social phenomenon. However, they entertained the idea that music originated long before the development of social consciousness, forgetting that thought is impossible without its material form, language. It was precisely this viewpoint which predominated in our musicology prior to the appearance of I. V. Stalin's work, "Marxism and Problems of Linguistics."

This theory never did explain the basis of the development of man's consciousness and his organs of hearing, without whose appropriate development not only the creation of music, but its perception, would have been impossible. Actually, singing, like speech, is a meaningful production of sounds which requires specific skills and voice control. These things were historically prepared by the long development of phonetic speech. Otherwise it

would have been simply astounding how the undeveloped human pharynx, unadapted to articulate speech, could have been capable of reproducing harmonious and melodious sounds.

We said above that not all combinations of sounds constitute music. Music always express something. Moreover, it must express both thoughts and emotional states. All of these things flow into the soul of music itself -- into its melody. A. N. Serov writes: "Music to the ancient Greeks was exclusively a melodic combination of sounds, the relationship of one sound to another, and their sequence -- not their simultaneous production." (A. N. Serov, "Selected Articles," Vol. I, page 90.) Thus the history of music is essentially the history of the development and formation of melody. Consequently, music is a meaningful and humanized combination of sounds.

In the foregoing we spoke of the significance of intonation. It is a very important element of language. But at the same time it is organically related to aural perception. Therefore, there can be no question of any art of music, even in primitive form, if the organ of hearing is undeveloped, since for the unmusical ear even the most perfect music is irrelevant. But if intonation is the basis of language and music itself, it follows that the art of music is a copy -- an impression -- of verbal language. To deny this is equivalent to taking the viewpoint of Kant, who considered music as an art of pure form.

As B. V. Asaf'yev points out, we have now become accustomed to speaking "without tones." And yet, how richly and tunefully meaningful is folk speech, peasant speech, in those areas where it has not been lost. Persons who speak musically, with a beautiful, deep timbre, arouse feelings of friendliness and sympathy. One feels natural expressiveness, spiritual warmth, in their speech. Therefore, one cannot limit (as philologists and literary specialists sometimes do) the sphere of intonation to the intonations of question and answer, surprise, denial, doubt, etc. The sphere of intonations, like that of meaningful sound production, is actually limitless. But the selection of intonations in art at each social stage is limited. (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Musical Form as a Process." Book II, page 33.)

In another passage, B. V. Asaf'yev makes a remarkable summary of the foregoing idea, disclosing the genuine sources of the birth of music. He writes: "...the intonation of a human voice which is near and dear to us possesses unlimited content, even when repeating one and the same conventional phrase... Is it not in such phenomena that one finds the source of music -- but of a humanized music, music as the tonal expression of thought and of the soul, the music of the inflections of the human voice, of a spiritualized and tool-making culture in its highest attainments?" (Loc. cit.)

Thus intonation is the source of music, since the latter (in the expression of B. V. Asaf'yev), being born in the

consciousness of the composer, is a consequence of the refusion of the world as felt by him, into audibility. Music (especially vocal music), being speech made musical, is a product of the human voice acting as its first principle.

As we know, language increases in complexity as human experience is enriched and the quantity of objects produced by human labor is increased. But at this point the sound component is speech, which plays an important role in communication, becomes inadequate and is gradually enriched by shades of intonation, which at the same time increase its range of meaning.

In time (especially in the period when the handicrafts separate from agriculture and trade makes its appearance) there arises in independent form an art which already to a large extent expresses those human thoughts and feelings requiring new forms for their expression.

Consequently, intonation as the most important element in music is a social phenomenon which arises only at that stage in the development of consciousness when man's hearing has become perfected to the point where the reality surrounding man can be expressed in figurative-artistic form. Whereas language is associated with a lower stage in the development of human thought, art in general and music in particular, are associated with a definite level in the development of abstract thought, when man manipulates general concepts which likewise require figurative forms of expression. Consequently, music is chronologically a more recent development than language.

Whereas language has a direct relationship to production, the art of music, gradually detaching itself from language, is a variety of one of the forms of social consciousness containing all elements of the superstructure system and hence associated with production indirectly; i.e., through the basis. At the outset the production of spiritual values was itself of a collective character and took place in the very process of the production of material values. Subsequently, with the individualization of the character of labor, there was increasing individualization of the process of producing spiritual values, brought to completion by the division between mental and physical work.

It has long been recognized that vocal music arise earlier than instrumental music, since the independent emergence of the latter took place at a relatively high stage in the development of musical culture. Consequently, singing is the foundation of the art of music. A. N. Serov correctly noted that vocal music is more important than instrumental music. But the range of the human voice is limited. Therefore, musical instruments, which assist the voice, came upon the scene. All music, strictly speaking, is singing (or that which belongs to it, or supplements it, or provides a setting for it.) (A. N. Serov, "Critical Articles." Vol IV, St. Petersburg, 1895, pages 1587-1587.)

We find a similar statement in the works of N. G. Chernyshev-skiy, who in his book "The Esthetic Relationships of Art to Reality," wrote that the original and essential function of instrumental music was to service as an accompaniment for singing. Moreover, he considered instrumental music to be an imitation of vocal music. Hence he very justifiably assumed that human beings prefer vocal art, since no instrument can compare with it in terms of overtones and the tonal palette. This is precisely why a special role is reserved for the violin, since it is better able than other instruments to imitate the human voice. Apropos of violin virtuosi it is often said that they make the violin sing. The famous Paganini was one such virtuoso.

As mankind progressed there was a gradual transition from rhythm and percussion instruments to instruments reproducing melodic sounds and demanding of the executant both warmth and inspiration. It is for this reason that orchestral works -- especially those of Glinka and Tchaikovskiy -- are abundant in melodic material.

As we know, art in general and music in particular have their own form and content; otherwise they would not produce such an effect on human beings. B. V. Asaf'yev wrote: "When I state that the source and roots of the Realistic in music are to be found in the intoned communication among human beings and the indications of these generalized elements of music in the works of the musical past and present, I am attempting to base the problem of musical Realism on the indisputable experience of musical communication, on the constantly occurring process of appropriation, evaluation, recognition, and non-recognition of music by the surrounding milieu." (B. V. Asaf'yev, "Musical Form as a Process." Book II, page 63.) But when, in the musical works created by composers, the critical role of the social consciousness which receives them is ignored, they are (in B. V. Asaf'yev words) as unfit for life as any artificial language invented for oneself alone.

Such is the fate of works ignoring the principle of folk character and Realism. Consequently, in order to fulfill its real role, art must be imbued with folk character. It would be naive at the very least to deny that by its natural nature music assumes the existence of an intelligent organization of sound relationships (key). Only in the process of the appropriation of reality by work, when a relatively high stage in the development of the social psyche is attained, does an intentional manipulation of tonalities become possible. Consequently, the intentional reproduction of sounds as a product of profoundly human history is not a manifestation of instinct, as in the case of birds, but a completely rational utilization of sounds intended for definite cognitive and esthetic ends.

Thus it is only in proportion that he actively appropriates reality and engages in generalizing activity, that man begins

intentionally to produce qualitatively definite musical relationships. A musical sound develops only in the process of the conscious reproduction of original musical sound production and its intentional repetition many times over. (R. Gruber, "The History of Musical Culture." Vol. I, page 143.)

It is well known that sound as an acoustic phenomenon is not intonation, since music begins at the point where sound acquires a particular quality; i.e., where it becomes tone. Consequently, intonation is the product of a later development, since primitive human beings were more interested in what was said than how it was said. Actually, intonation is a determining factor in music, whereas in speech it plays only an auxiliary role. Intonation is the expressive-significant specific trait of music.

One must acknowledge in a certain sense the reasonable assumption that the invention of the bow and arrow preceded the invention of the first string instruments, since the taut bow-string makes humming sounds after the release of the arrow; and when one hears these sounds, one can discern the differences in their pitch caused by the differences in the frequency of oscillation. But a rather long time must have passed before the ear was adequately developed and the human consciousness became capable of calling up the corresponding associations. It is for this reason that the creation of even primitive musical instruments cannot be assigned to some chance circumstance.

Scientific esthetics does not conceive of the production of musical instruments apart from the process of the formation of esthetic capacities in man; otherwise, it would be necessary to recognize as correct those who affirm the automatic transformation of work tools into musical instruments.

What factors, then, facilitated the development of musical instruments? There were two such factors. First, the formation and growth of esthetic requirements organically related to the level of development of productive capacities. The invention of instruments with metal string was due not only to esthetic requirements but also to the discovery of improved methods of working metals. Thus the production of instruments and the esthetic capacity are in positions of dialectical unity. Whereas the growth of esthetic requirements stimulated the production of musical instruments, the invention of instruments possessing greater and richer tonal properties stimulated esthetic tastes to an even greater degree, engendering new artistic demands. It is quite natural that the invention of several improved musical instruments would expand the expressive possibilities of the orchestra, enriching the arsenal of sound-producing devices at the disposal of the composer.

In Beethoven's day the orchestra did not possess the expressive possibilities it now has. In creating his monumental symphonic works, Beethoven had to conform to the existing

availability of instruments. To a certain extent, this left an impress on his work. Actually, his music did not sound the same in his day as it does now. The contemporary sound of Beethoven's works was achieved by means of the orchestration of Wagner, who introduced into the orchestra several instruments which were lacking in the time of Beethoven. Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov possessed greater possibilities for the orchestration of their works than did Glinka at the outset of his career. It would be simply unscientific to deny the importance of various musical instruments in determining the corresponding esthetic problems solved by musical compositions.

So-called associative feeling is tremendously important both in artistic creation and in art appreciation. It is undoubtedly associated with the level of intellectual development and the capacity for abstraction. In this connection I find noteworthy very interesting article by S. Obraztsov, "The Theatre of the Chinese People," in which he demonstrates in a remarkable manner the importance of associative feeling in the process of both artistic creation and art appreciation. ("Inostrannaya Literatura" [Foreign Literature], 1955, No. 1.) Obraztsov says that in China the astounding works of nature herself are no less pleasing esthetically than works produced by human hands. In the museums and public recreational buildings in China one can see boulders of astoundingly expressive form on display. They are not the product of labor-loving human hands, but the work of nature herself. Sometimes on a smooth marble surface, thanks to the intricate veins of various colors, one can imagine either a seascape or a cloud. In one of the public recreational buildings in China the visitors always stop in front of a marble slab on which, thanks to the special arrangement of the layers, one can see two erect dogs with fluffy tails and curly coats. The emotional impact of these works of nature is no less strong than that of works of graphic art.

Is it not true that we experience the same thing when looking at any work of graphic art? What is it that in looking at the aforementioned marble slab we have the same thought as when looking at a painting? This happens because what we have just seen is associated with that which is already familiar to us from our real environment. As S. Obraztsov correctly says, the perception of any work of art is a process of associative feeling. Moreover, associations of this kind do not arise only when we encounter a work of art. It suffices to mention the frost patterns on windows, which remind us of all possible kinds of trees and flowers. And the waves moving across a rye field remind us of rough weather at sea or on a lake.

S. Obraztsov writes: "Association, as one of the forms of comparison, is the basic process in the sensory-figurative cognition of the world; and in this sense the associative perception of phenomena of nature is on the same level with the associative

perception of works of art, and constitutes a sphere of esthetic sensations. A person who does not experience esthetic pleasure from the phenomena of nature cannot get it from works of art. As for the creator of such works, the associative-figurative sensation of the environment constitutes for him the actual material of his creation." ("Inostrannaya Literatura," 1955, No. 1, page 234.)

Associative fantasy and the associative perception of natural phenomena are a very important factor not only in the process of creating a work of art but in its appreciation. Natural objects stimulate and nourish, so to speak, the creative fantasy.

Thus an important problem of art is that of the degree of association of any inventive conventionality with real phenomena. And this is also the capacity to combine the conventional formula with reality. However, according to Professor A. A. Miller, the experiment he conducted with Papuans brought to Europe showed that they remained entirely indifferent to beautiful drawings of their huts in a book. Their curiosity was manifested only in the form of feeling the book as some kind of object: the illustrations aroused absolutely no interest in them. (A. A. Miller, "Primitive Art." Book I, L, 1929.)

This instance testifies to the underdevelopment of associative feeling in the Papuans -- a feeling which is a very important factor in art. If we consider the underdevelopment of the associative feeling in the Papuans, we can derive a clear picture of the state of this feeling in primitive human beings.

Art is the product, not of empirical thought, but of abstract thought, which alone is capable of making possible a deep penetration into the very essence of objects and phenomena. Any art is the fruit of creation; but this by no means signifies that any creation is art. Actually, the emergence of such specific properties of human nature as a feeling of personal worth, courage, firmness, reliability, and finally, the feeling of duty, is likewise the product of a definite stage in social development. For example, L. Morgan assigns the appearance of these qualities to the period of arrows, stone knives, and even bronze implements. (Lewis G. Morgan, "Ancient Society." L, 1935.) Consequently, new spiritual traits which required a special form of expression appeared in human nature. Is this not one of the deepest sources of the origin of art?

At the dawn of human society, nature provoked feelings of terror and fright in men. Other feelings were foreign to them. Nature dominated the human consciousness completely by virtue of the fact that it also ruled in the sphere of his material life. In this period, a poetic admiration of nature was foreign to man. Therefore, until these feelings arose, there could be no question of the artistic perception of nature -- of artistic creation.

From this it is clear that the development of religious sentiments chronologically preceded that of esthetic feeling.

Religious ideas arose as a result of the vigorous activity of the human brain, and constituted a unique first stage in the process of the formation and development of abstract-logical human thought, since in this case thought for the first time detached itself from reality. In this detachment and fantasizing is found the cause of the development of the first very primitive forms of religious ideas. Although these ideas bore witness to the undivided rule of natural forces over man, they nonetheless signified the beginning of the gradual taming of those forces. Consequently, however primitive man's consciousness at the first stage of his development, it nonetheless bore within itself the elements of creativity, which were increasingly multiplied as practical activity expanded. It is only on this basis that we can understand Marx's statement that at the very outset, consciousness was a social product, and that it will remain such so long as human beings exist at all. It is precisely by virtue of this fact that man, in contradistinction to the animals, has been able with varying degrees of accuracy to reflect the external world in his consciousness.

Marx pointed out that in the origin of his development, man had not yet distinguished between himself and nature, and that the only sphere of his spiritual activity was "natural religion," in which man affirms not himself, but nature as deified by him. "The sensory perception of the fetishist is different from the sensory perception of the ancient Greek, since his sensory existence was different. An abstract enmity between the feelings and the soul was necessary until man by his own labor had created a human taste for nature, a human feeling for nature, and hence a natural feeling of man." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol III, 1st edition, page 660.) Consequently, in those days, nature in the eyes of primitive man was a frightening, secret, and strange power which aroused a feeling of oppression and helplessness in him. Man had not yet distinguished between himself and nature. V. I. Lenin wrote in this connection "that primitive man received all that was necessary from nature, as a gift, is a stupid fairy tale... There was never any golden age in our past. Primitive man was completely oppressed by the difficulty of existing -- the difficulty of combatting nature." (V. I. Lenin, "Works," Vol. 5, page 95.)

Thus artistic creation begins only when man has sufficiently overcome his fetishistic, servile worship of the forces dominating him. And this, in the final analysis, is determined by the level of development of society's material existence. Consequently, whereas religion assumes the interpretation of nature by the human imagination in a perverted form, in art this interpretation takes place when man is sufficiently distinguished from nature and has created his own human nature, assuming the enrichment of his spiritual world and intelligent activity. (This question has been discussed in detail in a dissertation by I. B. Astokhov. Cf. I. B.

Astakhov, "The Origin and Development of Art in the Light of Marxist-Leninist Esthetics." Dissertation, M. 1953.) The practical activity of human beings, enriching itself from one day to the next, expanded the horizons of their notions of the world, facilitating the gradual but continuous displacement of elements of illusion and the fantastic in their consciousness.

This is why we do not share the opinion still current among certain archeologists and ethnographers to the effect that artistic thought and activity precede the rise of religious ideas.

The limited spheres of the creative activity of primitive man were governed only by the primitive level of his material practice. The cliff paintings of primitive peoples were by no means intended to express an esthetic attitude toward reality, since from their viewpoint they were of a crudely practical character; although on the basis of a formal criterion or method of comparison, these paintings do represent figurative-artistic activity.

It seems to us that the criterion generally accepted in the science of esthetics for determining the specific nature of art is in no way applicable to primitive art, which is utilitarian in character.

With respect to a primitive society one can speak only of the beginnings of esthetic feeling -- of an embryonic state of art. When one attempts to establish the nature of a certain object or phenomenon seen as the work of human hands, one must know the purpose and end for which they were created. In this connection it is very apropos to recall those remarkable statements of V. I. Lenin in which he convincingly demonstrated the complete untenability of eclecticism and the irresistible force of dialectic logic. He wrote: "A glass is indisputably a vitreous cylinder and a utensil for drinking. But a glass does not possess merely these two properties or qualities or aspects, but an infinite number of other properties, qualities, aspects, relationships, and "interpolations" with the rest of the world. A glass is a heavy object which may be thrown... it may have value as an object with decorative carving or painting, quite regardless of whether it is used for drinking, whether it is made of glass, whether its form is cylindrical or not at all cylindrical, and so on and so forth."

"Furthermore, if right now I need a glass for drinking, it is totally unimportant for me to know whether its form is completely cylindrical and whether it is actually made of glass; but it is important that there are no cracks in the bottom, and that I won't cut my lips when I use it." (V. I. Lenin, "Works." Vol. 32, pages 71-72.)

In this example quoted from V. I. Lenin we can already see how human requirements change with respect to the objects men produce. A glass which has undergone specific artistic workmanship is transformed into an art object in which the esthetic element

is the most important, while the utilitarian element plays only an auxiliary role. On the other hand, if the esthetic element ceases to be primary and becomes secondary, the glass may become anything you want, but not an art object.

F. V. Plakhanov's statement that man first looks upon objects and phenomena from a utilitarian viewpoint and subsequently adopts an esthetic viewpoint, means in practice that even the products of handicrafts, if their creation requires artistic skill, may be transformed into art objects, since they will then correspond to requirements imposed by the nature of art itself, and since in the given case the esthetic element becomes the decisive factor. It was precisely in this way that the production of decorations and luxury articles arose.

In analyzing the nature of primitive art one must always bear in mind that, as Marx and Engels taught, consciousness is always conscious existence. Consequently, however primitive and vague the manifestations of this consciousness in human beings, they always function as products of their material life process.

Marx had the following to say about the dawn of the development of social man and his culture. "The production of ideas, notions, and consciousness was originally directly embodied in the material activity and the material communalism of human beings -- in the language of real life. The formation of notions, thought, and spiritual communalism of human beings is in this case a direct product of the material relations of those human beings." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works." Vol. 3, 2nd edition, page 24).

Thus the primitive spiritual activity of early man was considered by himself as an integral part of his material production process.

The above quotations from the classical authors of Marxism testify to the fact that when the spiritual production was embodied in the material, dances and drawings, being organically merged with the magic rites considered as an indispensable part of the production process, were not art and, consequently, were not subordinated to esthetic purposes. In the process of the further enrichment of human practice there took place not only the differentiation of the forms of material production but also the gradual separation of spiritual production from the former.

Only in the class society did the process of the definitive separation of spiritual production from material production take place, thanks to which art became an independent form of ideological activity.

There is one more circumstance of considerable importance which should in no case be lost from view. It is true that at the first stages of its development, human thought was of an empirical and concrete character. The level of abstracting activity in thought was extremely low and wretched. Originally, consciousness

served as a direct reflection of the uncomplicated material life of primitive man. Subsequently, as man developed his capacity for abstraction and generalization, he tended increasingly to differ from his prototype. As a consequence, there was a weakening of his sensory-visual acuity, while his generalizing activity became strong and complete. As Gruber correctly states, the naturalistic reproduction of the work process was replaced by a gradually generalized one. Such was the path from appearance to essence. To a considerable extent, this weakening of the naturalistic means of the direct reproduction of the phenomena of objective reality was due to the changeover to agriculture and the associated deification of such phenomena as the wind, rain, thunder, etc., where the possibility of their direct imitation is ruled out. Consequently, a natural strengthening of the element of interpolation undoubtedly took place in primitive thought. (Cf. R. I. Gruber, "The History of Musical Culture." Vol. I.)

The importance and decisiveness of the role played by men's material activity in the content of their spiritual lives is shown by the fact that whereas at the stage of totemism the hunters of the tribe confined themselves to the deification of animals, at the stage of early agriculture they had reached a level of abstraction which enabled them to deify the forces of nature, thereby preparing the conditions for the emergence of the beginnings of anthropomorphism. L. Morgan observed this stage in the development of the Iroquois. However, the Iroquois were already familiar with pottery, spinning, and weaving; i.e., man had already made a considerable distinction between himself and nature, and had even risen above it, a condition precedent to deliberate artistic creation.

I. P. Pavlov pointed out that abstraction is for man an incomparable instrument of orientation toward the external world, enabling him to include that world in general forms of time, space, and causality. Consequently, all knowledge and all truth is in the final analysis interpolated. That which appears obvious at first glance to contemporary man may not have been true at all for his distant ancestors. That which has undergone the process of interpolation over a period of many millenia of human experience becomes axiomatic.

Thus the seeming obviousness of various axioms has been inherited by human beings. V. I. Lenin also pointed up that fact. He wrote: "...human experience, multiplied billions of times, has fixed the figures of logic in the human consciousness. These figures possess... an abstract character precisely (and only) by virtue of those billions of repetitions." (V. I. Lenin, "Philosophical Notebooks," page 188.)

In conclusion let me repeat that the purpose of the present article was not simply to show how the process of the development of esthetic feeling took place but also to explain the causes of

the illusions of those investigators who consider the pseudo-artistic activity of primitive man, which he himself regarded as an indispensable part of the production process, as artistic activity having an esthetic end as a basis. A viewpoint of this kind can give satisfaction only to the advocates of "pure art." In this connection it is appropriate to recall that I. P. Pavlov, in criticizing Freud's idealistic theory of psychoanalysis, ridiculed his statement that the behavior of animals and man was based on "the pleasure principle." I. P. Pavlov, citing the example of nesting in the case of birds, which is associated with the preservation of the genus, concluded that a great many things in the behavior of animals and men are determined by necessity and are done, as it were, counter to pleasure.

Those investigators who consider the cliff paintings of animals from the Upper Paleolithic as a special form of artistic activity ignore the question as to why, in the subsequent period of the Neolithic, when polished and ground tools were widely used and considerable attainments in ornamentation had been reached, we do not encounter cliff paintings of animals? The statement that the human beings of the Neolithic had simply lost their previous skill in painting would hardly be convincing. The answer, obviously, is either that hunting had lost its original vital importance because man had discovered more reliable means of subsistence, or that the hunting weapons had become so much better (the appearance of the bow and arrow) that it was no longer necessary to make cliff paintings of animals which had to be imitated before each hunt.

It is not a matter of chance that floral motifs are lacking in the ornamentation of the primitive and hunting tribes. From beginning to end, this ornamentation is replete with motifs taken from hunting. Ernst Gross drew attention to this fact in his book, "The Sources of Art."

He writes: "The motifs of ornamentation borrowed by the hunting tribes from nature consist exclusively of animal and human forms -- they selected, therefore, precisely those phenomena which were of the greatest practical interest to them... This explains why in his (man's -- G. A.) ornamentation we do not find even a trace of those floral motifs so richly developed in the decorative art of civilized peoples. Actually, the transition from animal decoration for floral decoration is the symbol of the greatest progress in the history of culture -- the transition from the hunting way of life to the agricultural." (Quoted in G. V. Plakhanov, "Art and Literature," GIKHL [State Publishing House of Creative Literature], M, 1948, page 63.)

If we consider the Paleolithic cliff paintings as genuine works of art having esthetic aims, it becomes impossible to understand why man lost his interest, not only in animal motifs, but in this kind of painting altogether.

Marx and Engels correctly pointed out that "feelings which are imprisoned by crude practical necessity have only a limited meaning. For a starving man food does not exist in a human form; it has only an abstract existence as food per se; and it is impossible to say in what respect this method of satisfying the need for food differs from the animal method of satisfying it... An impoverished and care-ridden man is incapable of understanding the most beautiful plays... Thus it was necessary to embody human nature both theoretically and practically in order to humanize the nature of man, and to create the corresponding human meaning for an understanding of all the richness of nature and the nature of man." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works." Vol III, 1st edition, pages 627-628.)

It is clear from the foregoing remarks that during the Paleolithic Period, human beings could not have been so far humanized, and they could not have possessed such an abundance of time and leisure, as to create purely artistic values based on esthetic aims.

Thus in the Upper Palaeolithic we are not dealing with art in the modern sense of the word, since in this case we should have to recognize that primitive man was guided chiefly by esthetic considerations in drawing animals; nor, a fortiori, are we dealing with Realism associated with the penetration into the essence of phenomena and the deliberate selection of the most important and the most typical. Here, in modern language, we are dealing with zoological or physiological naturalism in representation of animals, profoundly associated with utilitarian goals. Here everything is subordinated to the task of representating a reality which spoke for itself as reality. No importance was attributed to the subjective "I" or its judgement.

N. G. Chernyshevskiy considered art as an esthetic and artistic array of passing sentence on reality. Only the modernizers can attribute to primitive man a similar view of the drawings of animals he devised. It would be naive to affirm that the productions of primitive painting discovered in the depths of caves and at great distances from the entrance, where they could have been painted only with artificial illumination, were pursuing esthetic and not magical ends. In the former case it would be necessary to acknowledge the existence in those times of a particularly artistic activity, and that under conditions of a primitive form of division of labor by age and sex.

Lenin's statement that the savage had not made any distinction between himself and nature is fully applicable to the tribal way of life. (Cf. V. I. Lenin, "Philosophical Notebooks," Page 67.) But this by no means signifies that there was not a slow and constant process of detachment. Indeed, Marx, Engels, and Lenin pointed out that the ancient Greeks had distinguished between themselves and nature, and had placed themselves above it. This is precisely the period of the humanization of the gods, when according to mythology,

the gods inhabiting Mt. Olympus were endowed with all of the human traits. Moreover, man was already throwing up bold challenges to the gods, as we see in the myth of Prometheus. Consequently, it was only at this stage in his social development that man distinguished himself from nature to such an extent as to oppose it completely in his role as percipient subject. At this point there is a leap, and there arises a new sphere of spiritual production -- artistic production -- whose chief purpose is to satisfy the esthetic needs of man.

In the preceding stages of social development, the elements of artistic activity were organically bound up with productive activity, continuing to play a subordinate and auxiliary role, favoring the accumulation of the necessary esthetic factors, which not until the period of the flowering of the agricultural community, on the eve of slavery (with the formation of an adequate abundance of material production) were able to develop into an independent field of activity and lay the foundations for art as such, as a form of social consciousness. The separation of the crafts from agriculture and, finally, of mental from physical labor, served as a strong impulse for the rapid flowering of the artistic factors.

Thus almost throughout the history of the pre-class society (except for the period of the agricultural community), artistic activity as such was lacking. But the elements of this activity were dissolved in the very production of utilitarian objects, and played an auxiliary role. Art as a special sphere of human activity with the chief purpose of satisfying the esthetic needs of man arises later and only on the basis of the production of practically useful things with the presence of esthetic elements.

One must acknowledge the profound correctness of Engel's conclusion, when he wrote: "One thing is clear: so long as human labor so unproductive that it yielded only a negligible surplus over and above the vitally necessary means, the growth of productive capacities, the expansion of relations, the development of the state and the law, and the creation of the arts and sciences were possible only by means of an intensified division of labor... The simplest ... form of that division of labor was precisely slavery." (F. Engels, "Anti-Duhring," page 170.)

From the foregoing statement of Engels it follows that the development of art and science as forms of social consciousness occurred simultaneously. And this is understandable. Why should thought in figurative-artistic form have developed long in advance of thought in the form of concepts? Especially when it be remembered that both forms, one in no less a degree than the other, require an adequately high level of development of abstract thought, and a profound generalization of the essential and systematic in reality. And yet Hegel considered thought in images as a phenomenon of the lowest order.

The historic resolutions of the 20th Congress of our Party in the sphere of ideological work, and N. S. Khrushchev's statements on problems of art and literature, urgently require of all workers on the front of theoretical science that they bend every effort to defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism -- the principles of genuinely abjective science. It is only in this way that one can achieve a concrete-historical approach to the evaluation of the most important social problems associated with the dawn of human society, and defend genuine science from all possible attacks on the part of the contemporary bourgeois falsifiers of history.

END